Incomplete Information, Risk Shifting, and Employment Fluctuations by Herschel I. Grossman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, RISK SHIFrING,
AND EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS
Herschel I. Grossman
Working Paper No. 534




The National Science Foundation and the John Simon Guggenheim
Memorial Foundation have supported this research. Oliver Hart gave
me useful comments. The research reported here is part of the
NBER's research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #534
August, 1980
Incomplete Information, Risk Shifting,
and Employment Fluctuations
ABSTRACT
This paper explores one of the ways in which acceptance of the hypothesis
that labor market transactions involve arrangements for shifting ris.k from workers
to employers strengthens the case for accepting the hypothesis that incomplete
infomtatiem is the critical factor in producing the positive effect of aggregate
demand for output em aggregate employment. The analysis shows that the introduction
of risk-shifting arrangements into models of incomplete information eliminates the
dependence of the relation between aggregate demand and aggregate employment em
the relative strengths of the usual substitution and income effects on labor supply
of perceived real wage rates or perceived real interest rates. In addition, the
analysis shows that the apparent fact that workers choose an amount of risk
shifting that gives them constant nominal wage rates implies that incomplete
information would produce a positive effect of aggregate demand on aggregate employ-
mente The key to these results is that risk shifting allows workers to use the
value of product associated with high levels of demand to supplement the income
associated with low levels of demand. Consequently, they can choose high emplO¥ffient
in states of high demand without causing a corresponding reduction in their expected
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(40l) 863-2606This paper· explores one of the ways in which acceptance of
the hypothesis that labor market transactions involve arrange-
ments for shifting risk from workers to employers strengthens
the case for accepting the hypothesis that incomplete information
is the critical factor in producing the positive effect of
aggregate demand for output on aggregate employment. The analysis
shows that the introduction of risk-shifting arrangements into
models of incomplete information eliminates the dependence of
the relation between aggregate demand and aggregate employment on
the relative strengths of the usual Substitution and income
effects on labor supply of perceived real wage rates or perceived
real interest rates. In addition, the analysis shows that the
apparent fact that workers choose an amount of risk shifting that
gives them constant nominal wage rates implies that incomplete
information would produce positive effect of aggregate demand on
aggregate employment. The key to these results is that risk
shifting allows workers to use the value of product associated
with high levels of demand to supplement the income associated
with low levels of demand. Consequently, they can choose high
employment in states of high demand without causing a corre-
sponding reduction in their expected marginal utility of
consumption.
We can briefly describe the two central hypotheses in this
paper as follows: According to the risk-shifting hypothesis,
relations between firm and workers implicitly involve two trans-
actions, which are typically embodied in implicit contracts.
First, firms purchase from workers labor services for use in
the production process and, second, firms sell to workers
insurance against undesirable income fluctuations. As a result
of these insurance arrangements, a worker's nominal wage income
equals either the value of his marginal product minus an implicit
insurance premium or the value of his marginal product plus an
implicit insurance indemnity, depending on whether the perceived
real consumption value of his marginal product is high or low.
According to the incomplete-information hypothesis, changes
in aggregate demand affect aggregate employment because- 2 -
individuals, especially labor suppliers, do not have sufficient
information to distinguish clearly the price and wage signals
transmitted by such disturbances from the price and wage
signals associated with shifts in the pattern of demand. This
incomplete information causes buyers and sellers to perceive
potential gains from trade incorrectly.
The analysis developed below focuses on the specific story
in which workers have incomplete information about the prices
of the items that they consume, and, hence, tend to over-
estimate the extent to which a change in the nominal value of
product, as signalled by the nominal wage rate, involves a
change in the real consumption wage rate; i.e., the terms of
trade between leisure and consumption--Friedman (1968),.
As indicated in the final section, results similar to
those explicitly derived below a~ply to another story
in which workers do not know whether a change in the wage
rate is permanent or transitory, and, hence, tend to over-
estimate the extent to which changes resulting from nominal
disturbances, which are assumed to be permanent, involve
changes in the 'terms of trade between current and future
leisure, as measured by the real rate of interest--Lucas and
Rapping (1970), Barro (1976), Lucas (1977), Azariadis (1978).
One frequent objection to incomplete-information models
is that they do not relate to observed employment fluctuations,
because they make no allowance for apparent symptoms of non-
wage rationing of employment, such as layoffs, and also
because they predict countercyclical variations in quit rates
and real wage rates. Recent work, however, has shown that
the incomplete-information paradigm, when extended to take
account of implicit risk-shifting arrangements, can be
consistent with the alleged facts of nonwage rationing of
employment and stickiness of real wage rates--Grossman (1978,
1979a, 1979b, 1980).- 3 -
The present paper focuses on another objection to incomp1ete-
information stories that we can get around by allowing for risk-
shifting arrangements. This objection is that, in order for the
predicted effect of aggregate demand on aggregate employment to
be positive, incomplete-information stories require sufficient
restrictions on worker utility functions to make the substitution
effect of changes in either perceived real wage rates or perceived
real interest rates dominate the income effect. One specific
context to which this theoretical objection applies is models in
which variations in aggregate employment reflect changes in the
number of hours per week that workers. choose to work. The main
results of the analysis below of such a model are that the intro-
duction of risk-shifting arrangements removes the need for these
strong restrictions on worker utility functions and that the
existence of risk shifting actually appears to insure that
increases in the nominal value of marginal product relative to
perceived prices have a positive effect on employment.
It is worth noting that the problem of strong restrictions
on worker utility functions does not arise in a third story
about incomplete information, which is that workers do not know
wage rates at various places of employment and, as a result,
can misjudge the probable returns from devoting time to job
search--Mortensen (1970). In this model, the income effect of
the perceived return to search reinforces the substitution
effect--Seater (.1977). However, an important reason for focusing
on perceptions of the real consumption wage rate rather than on
either job search or perceptions of the real interest rate is
that in these other two stories analogous worker behavior in
the labor and product markets would tend to produce a counter-
factual negative correlation between employment and consumption
expenditures--Barro and Grossman (1976, Ch. 7).
The need for strong restrictions on worker utility functions
also does not arise in simplified models that focus on the
choice problem of individual workers who decide between positive
employment and zero emp1oyment--Grossman (1978; 1980). In- 4 -
these models, income effects are unimportant, and no individual.
worker chooses positive employment when nominal wages are low
and zero employment when nominal wages are high. However, the
need for strong restrictions on utility functions would pre-
sumably reappear in the more interesting context of multi-worker
families who choose between positive employment and zero
employment for each of their members.
It is worth noting that the analysis below only considers
fluctuations in employment. Analysis of unemployment, in a
model that distinguishes properly between employment, unemployment,
and nonparticipation, raises additional problems--Seater (1978).
1. Analytical Framework
Consider a representative industry in which entrepreneurs
employ homogeneous labor services to produce homogeneous nonstorable
output. Given the number of workers per entrepreneur, the.produc-
tion function for each identical firm in the industry is
f CO, f I (R,) > 0, f II (R,) < 0,
where R, denotes the number of hours worked per week by each
identical worker in this industry. The entrepreneurs use the gross
revenue from the sale of this output to pay wages to the workers
and to provide income for themselves. The workers and the entre-
preneurs use their income to purchase a bundle of nonstorable
consumption goods. As in previous models that consider risk-
shifting arrangements, the present analysis abstracts for simplicity
from the holding of assets, including investment goods, commodity
inventories, and financial assets.
The objective of entrepreneurs and workers is to maximize
the expected value of their utility. Entrepreneurs obtain positive
and either constant or decreasing marginal utility from their
consumption, denoted by n. Specifically, for each entrepreneur,
utility is given by the function,
g(n), gl(n) > 0, g"(n) :: O.- 5 -
Workers obtain positive and decreasing marginal utility from
their consumption, denoted by c, and positive and increasing
marginal disutility from the number of hours worked per week.
Specifically, for each worker, utility is given by the
additively separable function,
u (c ) - v (£), u' (c) > 0, U II (c) < 0, v' (£) > 0, v" (£) > O.
As indicated above, the present analysis assumes that £ is
always positive.
The basic assumption underlying the risk-shifting hypothesis
is that entrepreneurs exhibit less risk-averse behavior than
workers. Some previous studies--forexample, Grossman (1978)--
have focused on the special case of risk-neutral
entrepreneurs--that is, g"(TI) = O--although Azariadis (1978)
considers a general specification that a~·lows universal
risk aversion. In the present context, the essential condition
is that the functions u(c) and g(TI) are such that the vectors
of c and TI that would obtain in the absence of risk-
shifting arrangements imply more variability in u' (c) than
in g' (TI). This condition creates the potential for mutually
advantageous risk-shifting arrangements that reduce the
variability of c and increase the variability of TI.
The analysis assumes that all markets are competitive.
Let P denote the price at which output is sold and let I
denote the price at which the consumption bundle is bought.
From the standpoint of the entrepreneurs and workers in
this industry, these prices are stochastic variables,
determined at periodic intervals by serially independent
drawings from exogenously determined populations.
The time pattern of these drawings generates the
information structure. Speci.fically, complete information
would describe a situation in which entrepreneurs observe P
and entrepreneurs and workers observe I before any trans-
actions or production take place. In contrast, incomplete
information describes a situation in which entrepreneurs
and workers do not observe I until after they have received- 6 -
their incomes from the production and sale of output at
price P.
An important assumption, which creates a meaningful
distinction between complete and incomplete information,
in that P and I are not perfectly correlated. This assumption
means that a high value of P can indicate either that P is
high both absolutely and relative to I or that P is high
absolutely but not relative to I. It is worth noting that
in this formulation entrepreneurs and workers have the same
information. Moreover, although this set-up leads to
an explicit story about perceptions of the real consumption
wage rate, the results derived also apply, as already mentioned,
to stories about perceptions of the real interest rate.
In order to represent the informational distinction between
P and I in the simplest way for present purposes, the analysis
assumes that P and I are independently distributed. This polar
assu~ption avoids the problem of calculating inferences about I
from observations of P. One implication of this formulation is
that the industry's own output is a negligible component of the
consumption bundle. Specifically, the population of P is such that
P with probability 1/2
1
P =
P with probability 1/2.
2




with probability 1/2,- 7 -
The assumption that each price can take where I > I > O.
2 1
only two equiprobable values is another convenient simplifica~
tion.
Under complete information, standard results about
homogeneity would imply that employment and output in this
industry depend only on the relative price P/I. Thus,
assuming for simplicity that P II = P II , the level of
1 1 2 2
employment associated with the combination (P ,I ),
1 1
the level of employment associated denoted £ , would be equal to
1 1
the combination (P ,I ), denoted £ , although £ and £
2 2 22 11 22
probably would not be equal to either" £ , associated with
12
(P ,I ), or 1 , associated with (P ,I). In other words,
1 2 21 . 2 1
under complete information, a change in the pattern of demand
probably would affect employment in this industry, but a
change in aggregate demand that changed all prices equi-
proportunately would not affect employment in this industry
or in aggregate. It is worth noting that these results would
obtain with or without risk-shifting arrangements in the labor
market--Barro (1977).
The purpose of introducing the case of incomplete
information is to try to explain the apparently observed
direct dependence of employment on aggregate demand--that is,
to generate the prediction that 1 is larger than 1
22 11
Under incomplete information, employment and output depend on
the observed value of P, but only on the probability dis-
tribution of I, because I itself is not observed until later.
Thus, there are only two possible levels of employment--1
1
associated with P and 1 associated with P. In addition,
1" 2 2
the expected value of PII is positively related to the
observed value of P, which implies that 1 might not equal 1 •
2 1
This potential inequality represents an effect of aggregate
demand on aggregate employment. A problem, however, is that,
without risk shifting, this effect is not necessarily positive.- 8 -
2. Aggregate D~mand and Employment Without Risk Shifting
In order to appreciate the significance of risk shifting
for the effect of aggregate demand on employment, this section
abstracts from such arrangements and analyses the implications
of incomplete information for a spot market for the labor
services employed in this industry. Competition in this
market determines a nominal hourly wage rate, denoted by W,
and the level of 1.
In this framework, transactions take place in two stages.
In the first stage, the entrepreneurs observe P and W, employ 1,
produce and sell f(1), and receive net revenue equal to
Pf(1) - Wi. At the same time, the workers observe W, work 1,
and receive income equal to wt. In the second stage, the
entrepreneurs observe I and consume [Pf(1) - W1]/I and the
workers observe I and consume Will.
With regard to the maximization of expected utility, the
only decisions that the entrepreneurs and workers have to make
concern the choice of 1 in the first stage. The specific







subject to the constraints
1T.. = [P. f (1.) - W, 1 . ]II .,
J.) J. J. J. J. )
interior solution
i where the index
the index j (j
(i = 1,2) refers to the value of P and
= 1,2) refers to the value of I. An
to this solution implies the two first-order
conditions
(1) P,fl(J,,) =W. for all i.
J. J. J.
These conditions indicate that maximization of expected utility
requires maximization of actual net revenue. The entrepreneurs- 9 -
choose employment such that, given the observed values ofP and W,
the value of marginal product equals the wage rate.
The specific problem for the workers is to choose
t and t to maximize
1 2
1 1 '4 I u (c.. ) - '2
i, j ~J
subject to the constraints
c .. = W. R../I .•
~J ~ ~ J
I veL),
i ~








the same pairs (t ,W )
1 1
and (2). Thus, we can
These conditions say that workers choose employment such that,
given the observed value of W, the ratio of the marginal
disutility of work to the wage rate equals the expected value
of the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption to the
price of the consumption bundle. Notice that according to
both equations (1) and (2), t depends on W , but not on W ,
1 1 2
and vice versa.
The condition for clearing the spot labor market is that
and (t ,W ) satisfy equations (1)
2 2
substitute P.f' (t.) from equations (1)
~ ~
for W. in equations (2), and solve these equations for Wand t
~ 1 1
. as functions of P and for Wand t as functions of P •
1 2 2 2
These calculations confirm that, without further restrictions
on the form of u(c), beyond the assumptions of positive and
diminishing marginal utility, the relation between t and R.
2 1
is ambiguous.- 10 -
To highlight this result, consider a family of u(c)
functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The
members of this family are u = (l_a.)-lcl-a. for a..~ 1 and
u = In c for a. = 1, where a. measures relative risk aversion.
If a. is less than unity, which roughly means that the
marginal utility of consumption declines slowly, the substitu-
tion effect of the real consumption wage rate on labor supply
dominates the income effect, and £ exceeds ~. This case is
2 1
the only one that implies a positive effect of aggregate
demand on employment. If a. equals unity, the substitution
and income effects are exactly offsetting, £ equals £ , and
2 1
employment is independent of aggregate demand. If a. is
greater than unity, but a.-I is less than -f' (£) v" (£)Iv' (£) fll (£)
which is positive, the income effect dominates the substitution
effect, £ exceeds £ , and an increase in aggregate demand
1 2
depresses employment.
For larger values of
In all of the above cases, W exceeds W •
2 1
a., W would not exceed W , and Walrasian
2 1
stability would be violated.
3. Aggregate Demand and Employment With Risk Shifting
The introduction of risk-shifting arrangements allows
each worker to break the equality, for each value of P,
between his nominal income, now denoted by n, and the product
of the value of his marginal product and his hours worked.
Specifically, contracts embodying risk shifting specify a
vector of employment levels and worker incomes (£ ,n ,£ ,n )
1 122
that makes employment and worker income contingent on the
observed value of P. This vector implies that nominal wage
rates, contingent on the observed value of P, are n 1£ and
. 1 1
n 1£ .
2 2- 11 -
Competition in the market for these contracts also
generates a vector of implicit prices. The elements of this
vector are Wand W , which now represent implicit values
1 2
for an hour of work, but do not necessarily equal hourly
wage rates, and an implicit price, denoted here by A, at which
workers and entrepreneurs exchange units of n for units of n .
2 1
represents In other words,
With risk shifting, each worker in effect receives as
part of his income a net insurance indemnity equal to
(n - W R. ), if the price of output is P , in exchange for a
1 1 1 1
reduction in income by the amount of an insurance premium
equal to (W R. - n ), if the price of output is P. The price
2 2 2 2
of risk shifting, A, is the ratio of the expected value of
1 .'
the premium, -2 (W R. - n ), to the expected value of the net
2 2 2
. d 't 1 (n n ) l.n emn1. y, -2 ~G ,. W)(" .
1 1 1
the exchange ratio between income to be received if the price
of output is low and income to be received if the price of
output is high.
A hypothetical value of ~ equal to unity would
characterize an actuarially "fair" price ·for risk shifting
and would imply that workers can obtain a constant nominal
income at no cost to themselves in average nominal income.
Actually, we seem to observe that nominal wage rates are
roughly constant, which in the present context means that
n /R. and n /R. are approximately equal. Given that employment
1 1 2 2
time is variable, this stickiness of nominal wage rates is
reflected in the fact that worker incomes are not constant,
although they may be less variable than they would be in a
spot labor market. The fact that risk shifting does not
eliminate income variability suggests that A actually exceeds
unity, an outcome that, according to the analysis in
Grossman (1977; 1978), implies either that entrepreneurs, as
well as workers, are risk averse, or that P is much larger
2
than P , which more generally would be that P is highly
1
variable, or that workers sometimes behave unreliably.- 12 -
In the framework of risk shifting, transactions take
place in three stages. In the first stage, before P is
observed, contracts are arranged. In this process, both
entrepreneurs and workers behave as if they observe the
vector (W ,W ,A) and then select a vector (1 ,n ,1 ,n ).
1 2 1 1 2 2
In the second stage, entrepreneurs observe P, employ 1 and
pay.the workers n according to the contracts, produce
and sell f(l), and receive net revenue equal to Pf(l) - n.
In the third stage, entrepreneurs observe I and consume
[Pf(1) ~ n]/I and workers observe I and consume 0/1.
With regard to the maximization of expected utility,
the only decision that the entrepreneurs and workers have to
make is to choose (1 ,n ,1 ,n) in the first stage. The
1 1 2 2
specific problem for the entrepreneurs is to choose this
vector to maximize
subject to the constraints
'IT.. = IP. f (1.) - n.]/1 .





1 = -2 (W 1 - n ).
2 2 ~




p.f' (1.) = W. for all i
~ 1. 1.
(3)
These conditions say that the entrepreneurs again choose
employment such ~t the value of marginal product equals the
cost of an hour of labor services, and that, given this choiceconsumption to the
of output is P equals
1
- 13 -
of t and t , tbey choose nand n such that the expected value
1 2 1 2
of the ratio of the marginal utility of their
price of the consumption bundle if the price
A times the expected value of this ratio if the price of output
is P. According to equation (3), the shifting of risk from
2
workers to entrepreneurs is attractive to the entrepreneurs if











would be without risk shifting. If the entrepreneurs are
risk neutral--that is, g"(1T) = Q--condition (3) is replaced by
a corner solution, as in Grossman (1978).
The specific problem for the workers is to choose
(t ,n ,t ,n) to maximize
1 122
1 . 1
'4 l u(c.. ) -"2 l vetil,
•• 1.J 1.'
1.,J
subject to the constraints
c .. = n./1.
1.J 1. J
and
An interior solution to this problem implies the first-order
conditions
v' (t . ) 1 u' (c.. )
(2)
1. l
1.J for all i = "2 w. I.
1. j J
and
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Equations (2) are the same conditions that applied without
risk shifting and equation (4) has the same interpretation- 14 -
as equation (3)•.According to equation (4), the shifting of
risk from workers to entrepreneurs is attractive to the workers








would be without risk shifting. Notice that equations (2) and (4)
imply that £ and £ each depend on W , W , and A.
1 2 1 2
The condition for clearing the market for labor contracts
is that the same sets (W ,W ,A) and (£ ,n ,£ ,n) satisfy
1 2 1 122
equations (1) and (3) and equations (2) and (4). For present
purposes, the most interesting manipulation is to combine






Equation (5) implies that, given the values of P and P and the
1 2
to use the value of
supplement the income
and £ to be lower than they
1
effect results from the
shifting risk to the entrepreneurs
the existence of such risk
restriction on A necessary for
to be attractive to the workers,
shifting causes £ to be higher
2
would be in a spot labor market. This
fact that risk Shifting allows workers
marginal product associated with P to
2
associated with P. This option suppresses the income effect
1
that in the spot-labor-market model would tend to reduce £
2
and increase £ and could easily dominate the substitution effect.
1
Specifically, with risk shifting, workers can choose a rela-
tively high level of £ without causing a corresponding reduction
2
in the relative expected marginal utility of consumption
associated with P •
2
From equation (5), we can infer the relation between
£ and £ without explicitly referring to either the function
1 2- 15 -
u(c) or the function g(n). The effects of the forms of these
functions are summarized in the value of A. According to
equation (5), given the assumptions of positive and increasing
marginal disutility from employment and positive and decreasing
marginal productivity, A less than P IP is necessary and
2 1
risk averse relative to
does not follow simply from assuming
shifting. Specifically, analysis of
reveals that A greater than P Ip
2 1
shifting if workers are sufficiently
entrepreneurs.
sufficient for £ larger than £ •
2 1
The interesting question is whether actual risk-shifting
arrangements satisfy the condition A < P IP. This condition
2 1
the existence of risk
the first-order conditions
does not preclude risk
Assuming, however, that the above model of risk shifting is
true, the fact that nominal wage rates are sticky implies that the
condition A < P Ip actually is satisfied. To derive this
2 1
result, consider whether the observation that the chosen vector
(£ ,n ,£ ,n) has n 1£ equal to n 1£ could be consistent
1122 11 22
with £ being equal to or less than £. Given the assumed form
2 1
of the v(£) and f(£) functions, £ equal to or less than £
2 1
would imply, by equation (5) that A exceeds unity. Given A
greater than unity and the assumed form of the u(c) function,
equation (4) would imply that n is larger than n. However,
2 1
the combination of £ equal to or less than £ and n larger
2 1 2
than n would mean that n 1£ is larger than n 1£, a
1 2 2 1 1
contradiction to the observation that n 1£ equals n 1£
2 2 1 1
To further highlight this result, consider again the
family of u(c) functions that exhibit constant relative risk
aversion. For this family, equation (4) implies that workers
choose nand n such that (n In )a, where a measures worker
1 2 2 1
relative risk aversion, equals A. Consequently, the observa-
tion that the chosen vector (£ ,n ,£ ,n) has n 1£ equal
1 1 2 2 1 1- 16 -
to n It implies that <.t It )cx also equals A. Substituting
2 2 2 1
(t It)cx for A in equation (5) yields the implication that,
2 1
given cx > 0 and the assumed form of the v(t) and f(t)
functions, t is larger than t •
2 1
According to the above analysis, the apparent fact that
workers choose an amount of risk shifting that involves constant
nominal wage rates implies that the actual pattern of supply
and demand for risk shifting is generating a value of A less
than p IP. Given this pattern, the assumed structure of
2 1
incomplete information yields the implication that aggregate
employment depends positively on aggregate demand, without
further assumptions about the degree of worker risk aversion.
4. Generalization of the Results
The existence of risk-shifting arrangements has similar
implications for the relation between aggregate demand and
aggregate employment in the model developed by Azariadis (1978),
although he does not point out this effect. This model
incorporates risk shifting into another story about incomplete
information mentioned above, in which workers do not know
whether a change in the wage rate is permanent or transitory
and, consequently, may make employment decisions based on
misperceptions of the real interest rate. Given this informa-
tion structure, for aggregate demand to have a positive effect
on employment in a spot labor market, the substitution effect
of the perceived real interest rate on employment must dominate
the income effect. Azariadis focuses on the family of
utility functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion
and points out correctly that this dominance of the substitu-
tion effect requires that the relative risk aversion of the
workers be less than unity. As we saw above, in a spot labor
market, the story about misperceptions of the real wage rate
requires this same restriction on the utility function of the
workers.- 17 -
Further analysis of the Azariadis model, however, shows
that with the introduction of risk-shifting arrangements,
much weaker restrictions, which refer mainly to the utility
function of the entrepreneur, insure that aggregate employment
depends positively on aggregate demand. Using Azariadis'
notation, in which R denotes worker relative risk aversion,
Q denotes entrepreneur relative risk aversion, and a
denotes the ratio of worker .income to total product, his
equation (30a) has the following implications: A necessary
condition for a positive effect of aggregate demand on
aggregate employment is Q < 1. Moreover, if Q < 1 - a,
the existence of risk shifting, which implies R < Q, is a
sufficient condition. In other words, if Q is sufficiently
less than unity, no further restriction on R is required.
However, if 1 > Q > 1 - a, in addition to R > Q, a
necessary and sufficient condition is R < aQ/[Q - (1 - a)].
In other words, if Q is larger, but still less than unity,
R cannot be too large, but it can be greater than unity.
To summarize, this paper has explored one of the ways in
which the hypothesis of risk-shifting arrangements in the
labor market enhances the plausibility of the hypothesis that
incomplete information is the critical factor in producing
the positive effect of aggregate demand for output on
aggregate employment. Specifically, the analysis has shown
that allowing for risk shifting effectively blunts the
objection that the incomplete-information hypothesis requires
strong assumptions about worker utility functions. Because
risk shifting allows workers to use the value of product
associated with high levels of demand to supplement the income
associated with low levels of demand, they can choose high
employment in states of high demand without causing a
corresponding reduction in their expected marginal utility of
consumption. Thus, the introduction of risk shifting into- 18 -
models of incomplete information removes the need to assume
that the usual substitution effect of either perceived
real wage rates or perceived real interest rates dominates
the usual income effect. Moreover, given the risk-shifting
hypothesis, the observed stickiness of nominal wage rates
implies that the actual extent of risk shifting is
sufficient to insure that incomplete information would
produce a positive effect of aggregate demand on aggregate
employment.- 19 -
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